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We examine the potential gains from cooperation in the withdrawal of water from the 
Hueco Bolson aquifer that provides a substantial portion of municipal water supplies in 
El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.  The aquifer lies beneath the international 
border, and both cities operate independently regarding pumping rates and annual 
withdrawals.  The natural the rate of recharge has been less than the sum of annual 
withdrawals since the early 1900s, and the resource likely will be depleted if current 
pumping rates are maintained.  Optimal pumping rates and depths are described using a 
model that maximizes the sum of net benefits obtained from municipal water supplies in 
both cities.  Those results are compared with pumping rates and depths obtained using a 
dynamic game-theory model of strategic behavior involving the two cities. 
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Estimating Potential Gains to Cooperation 





  El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juarez, in the state of Chihuahua, Mexico are located 
on the Rio Grande River, which forms a portion of the international border between the 
United states and Mexico.  Since the early 1900s, most of the surface water flowing in the 
southern Rio Grande has been allocated to agricultural users in both countries.  As a 
result, both El Paso and Juarez have relied primarily on groundwater resources to meet 
municipal and industrial water demands.  In particular, both cities have obtained large 
portions of their water supply from the Hueco Bolson aquifer, which extends across the 
international border (Day, 1975, 1978; Armstrong, 1982; Earl and Czerniak, 1996). 
  Annual withdrawals from the Hueco Bolson have exceeded natural recharge rates 
for many years, causing a persistent decline in the volume of water stored in the aquifer 
(Charbeneau, 1982).  Since 1940, water tables have declined by more than 50 feet at 
many of the municipal wellfields serving El Paso and Juarez (Texas Water Development 
Board, 1997).  Some authors suggest that the recoverable supply of water in the Hueco 
Bolson will be exhausted at some time between 2005 and 2030, if current pumping rates 
are maintained (Eaton and Andersen, 1987, p. 53; Kuo, 2000; Paso del Norte Water Task 
Force, 2001;).   When depletion occurs, the cost of satisfying municipal and industrial 
water demands in the two cities will increase substantially, as replacement supplies must 
be imported from distant aquifers or purchased from farmers willing to sell or lease a 
portion of their surface water supply. 
   The cost of maintaining water quality in municipal water supplies also may 
increase with continued drawdown of the Hueco Bolson aquifer.  The salinity of water remaining in the aquifer increases as the volume becomes smaller, and  cones of 
depression caused by excessive pumping may cause salts to move from mud interbeds, 
degrading groundwater quality (Hibbs, 1999).  In addition, contaminants may enter the 
Hueco Bolson in cross-formational flows of water from the Rio Grande aquifer, as the 
gradient between the two aquifers increases with cumulative withdrawals from the Hueco 
Bolson (Hibbs and Boghici, 1999). 
  Water demands have increased in El Paso and Juarez in recent years with 
increasing populations and economic growth stimulated in part by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement.  Recognizing the challenge of providing water supply in future, El 
Paso began developing alternative water sources by leasing irrigation water rights from 
property owners in El Paso County in the 1960s (Day, 1978; El Paso Water Utilities, 
1999).  Water conservation programs including rebates for acquiring water-saving 
appliances and a water pricing structure that discourages excessive use have been 
implemented since the early 1990s (Bath et al., 1994).  As a result, the average per capita 
consumption of water has declined in El Paso and the city has reduced its withdrawals 
from the Hueco Bolson, while increasing its use of surface water.  Per capita incomes and 
water consumption are much lower in Juarez, but the population is larger and growing 
more rapidly (Zwerneman, 1977).  Juarez has increased its withdrawals from the Hueco 
Bolson in recent years, while not yet developing alternative water supplies (Chavez, 
2000). 
  The Hueco Bolson aquifer likely will be depleted in the near future if both cities 
continue to extract water to satisfy increasing municipal and  industrial demands.  
Depletion of the aquifer may be inevitable, but it may not be optimal from an economic 
perspective, as there may be value in maintaining some volume of water in the aquifer to 
provide municipal water supply in years when surface supplies are reduced by drought 
conditions.  If depletion is optimal, the present value of future costs of providing water 
supply will vary with the time depletion occurs and with alternative rates of groundwater withdrawal in the interim. 
  Depletion of the Hueco Bolson may occur more quickly than is optimal because 
neither El Paso nor Juarez has an exclusive right to extract water from the aquifer.  
Hence, neither city has a clear economic incentive to consider the marginal user cost 
imposed on the other city when determining how much water to withdraw each year.  As 
a result, the sum of annual withdrawals likely will exceed the socially optimal withdrawal 
in most years and the present value of net benefits will not be maximized over time. 
  El Paso and Juarez may gain financially by implementing a cooperative water 
management program in which the cities seek to achieve the optimal use of surface and 
groundwater resources to provide water supply in future.  Such a program may involve 
coordinated development of alternative surface and groundwater resources, and 
agreements regarding annual withdrawals and the volume of water to be maintained in the 
Hueco Bolson, in perpetuity.  The potential gains to both cities may include reductions in 
uncertainty and lower costs of providing water supply in future. 
  The goal of this paper is to estimate the potential gains to both cities from 
cooperating in their use of surface and groundwater resources to satisfy municipal and 
industrial water demands.  We compare the estimated costs of providing water supply 
from 2001 through 2030 in competitive and cooperative  scenarios that include depletion 
of the Hueco Bolson aquifer and maintenance of selected volumes of water in the aquifer, 
in perpetuity.  We formulate the problem in a dynamic game theory context and we 






 Conceptual Framework 
 
  Withdrawal of water from the Hueco Bolson for municipal supply in El Paso and 
Juarez can be viewed as a dynamic game in which the two cities may compete or 
cooperate when choosing the volume of water to extract each year.  The potential gains 
from cooperation include reducing the negative impacts of externalities involving 
pumping costs and depletion of a nonrenewable resource.  The pumping cost externality 
arises because the withdrawal of water by either city lowers the level of water in the 
aquifer, causing the cost of pumping to increase for both cities.  The depletion externality 
arises because annual withdrawals greatly exceed natural recharge, and the groundwater 
likely will be depleted in the near future.  Hence, each unit of water removed by either 
city imposes a marginal user cost on both cities because that water will not be available 
again in the future. 
  In the absence of well-defined property rights to a portion of the aquifer, neither 
El Paso nor Juarez has an economic incentive to consider the pumping cost externality or 
the marginal user cost it imposes on the other city when withdrawing water from the 
aquifer.  Pumping decisions based only on direct marginal costs and current marginal 
benefits of groundwater will not be optimal from the perspective of a social planner 
seeking to maximize the sum of net benefits generated with Hueco Bolson water in both 
cities, over time.   As a result, the resource will be extracted more quickly and depletion 
will occur sooner than is optimal as viewed from the broader, social perspective. 
  Pumping cost and resource depletion externalities arise often when groundwater 
and other open access resources are not allocated or priced appropriately to maximize 
social or public net benefits.  A third externality arises when individuals or cities compete 
strategically to gain access and obtain use of a scarce resource.  In a game theory context, 
the strategies employed by one player to gain greater access or use than other players may 
generate costs and activities that would not be undertaken in the absence of strategic competition.  For example, one city might install larger pumps and withdraw water more 
quickly than otherwise, simply because it is competing with the other city for use of the 
limited groundwater resource.  In the extreme, one city might construct storage facilities 
within its boundaries in which it could store groundwater extracted long before it is 
needed.  Such a pumping and hoarding strategy would generate direct costs and marginal 
user costs that could greatly reduce the social net benefits obtained from the limited 
groundwater. 
  The policy relevance of negative externalities involving open access groundwater 
resources often is a function of physical parameters describing an aquifer and economic 
parameters describing supply and demand characteristics.  For example, the gains in 
social net benefits achieved by regulating a very large, open access aquifer where 
pumping costs do not increase with declining water levels may be too small to justify 
policy intervention (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Allen and Gisser, 1984).  By contrast, 
regulation of pumping rates or taxation of volumes withdrawn may generate substantial 
net benefits  when a relatively small aquifer, if pumping costs increase with declining 
stock, or when social rates of discount are small (Brill and Burness, 1994). 
  The potential gains from cooperation among players in a game theory context also 
will vary with resource parameters and supply and demand characteristics. In addition, 
player attributes and the nature of the game will influence the sum of potential gains and 
the distribution of gains among individual players.  For example, larger players with 
better information or superior technology may gain less from cooperation than smaller 
players operating with limited information and inferior technology.  The sum of potential 
gains also may vary among games in which players implement open-loop decisions at the 
initial time period and games in which players may revise their strategies in any time 
period, as new information is obtained in future. 
  Policy issues regarding the competition for groundwater and the allocation of 
surface water are particularly challenging in the El Paso/Juarez region, as both resources are limited in supply and both move across the international border.  While a treaty has 
guided the allocation of surface water for many years, no similar agreement has been 
reached regarding groundwater.  The two cities have not developed a coordinated strategy 
regarding groundwater, although they have begun sharing information regarding 
withdrawals and aquifer characteristics in recent years (Chavez, 2000; Hume, 2000).  The 
potential gains to greater cooperation may be substantial for both cities, given their 
relatively low per capita incomes, the high cost of obtaining alternative water supplies, 





  Municipal water deliveries in the region are managed by the El Paso Water 
Utilities (EPWU) and the Junta Municipal de Agua y Saneamiento de Ciudad Juarez 
(JMAS).  The long-term goal of each agency might be described as minimizing the 
present value of the costs of providing municipal water supplies.  The annual cost of 
water delivery will vary with the costs of water obtained from different supply sources, 
such as the Hueco Bolson, other aquifers, and surface water sources.  For planning 
purposes, the volume of water required each year may be estimated as the product of 
population and a selected average consumption rate. 
  The per-unit cost of obtaining water from the Hueco Bolson will increase, over 
time, as the volume of water remaining in the aquifer declines.  Hence, the volume of 
water withdrawn from the aquifer each year generates both a current cost and a long-term 
cost by causing higher pumping costs in future.  In addition, the volume of water 
withdrawn by either city has an impact on future pumping costs for both cities.  This 
interaction is described with a per-unit pumping cost coefficient that is a function of 
pumping lift, which increases with cumulative withdrawals from the aquifer.   A plausible form of the cost function for either El Paso or Juarez is the following,  
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     where: ci,t  is the per-unit cost of obtaining water supply, in dollars 
per acre-foot, 
      h t  is the pumping lift, in feet 
      w 1,t, and w2,t, are volumes of water in acre-feet per year, 
      Q i,t  is the volume of water required each year, and 
      a i and bi  are cost function coefficients, 
                                           the subscript i, represents each city. 
       
The quantity of water required each year, Qi,t, is calculated as the product of population 
and the average annual per capita use of water.  Net benefits of water are defined 
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where: NBi,t  is the net benefit obtained in each city annually, and 
                               pi         is the price of water,  
 
The state equation governing changes in the pumping lift, over time, involves the sum of 
withdrawals from the aquifer by both cities, and is given by: 
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   where:    α  describes the specific yield of the aquifer and 





We measure the benefits from cooperation as the difference between the social 
optimum and the solution of a noncooperative dynamic game involving the two cities. 
The potential gains to cooperation can be described by the difference in the present value 
of net benefits generated when maximizing net benefits in both cities, and the present 
value of net benefits generated with each city acts strategically to withdraw groundwater 
in the absence of cooperation.  We examine several scenarios of groundwater pumping to 
determine both the potential gains to cooperation and to estimate the impact of key 
parameters on the rate of depletion of groundwater in the Hueco Bolson aquifer. 
 
The Social Optimum (Case of full cooperation) 
 
  The social optimum is defined as the solution that maximizes the sum of net 
benefits generated in the two cities, as described by the following net benefit function: 
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 The social optimum problem, for a given parameter and given initial stock availability h0 
is to maximize the following 
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where ρ is the discount factor and si,t is surface water delivered by each city as 
part of its municipal water supply, in acre-feet per year. 
 
To derive the socially optimal pumping strategies for both cities, we formulate a dynamic 
programming model of water consumption under the assumption that both cities are 
committed to cooperate and pursue optimal policies. The social problem becomes: 
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This is known as Bellman’s equation, and it uses the optimality principle to reduce an 
infinite horizon problem in a sequential two-stage decision problem. We solve this problem using backward induction, assuming that in each period we are on the optimal 
path.  The second term on the RHS gives the marginal social user cost of water 
consumption. This term reflects the long-term effect of pumping in future water 
consumption.   
  
Dynamic Game Theory Formulation 
 
  The non-cooperative game involving Juarez and El Paso is described by separate 
maximization problems, such as follows: 
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We construct a recursive algorithm using an algebraic software product to solve this set 
of functional equations using dynamic programing.  We estimate the potential gains to 
cooperation by examining both the socially optimal solution and the non-cooperative 






  The present value of net benefits generated during a 25-year scenario in which the 
sum of net benefits in the two cities is maximized is $333 million.  Pumping rates 
increase, over time, in both cities with increasing populations and the aquifer remains 
viable throughout the 25-year planning horizon.  The pumping lift increases from 400 feet 
initially to 674 feet in year 25 (Figure 1).  By comparison, the present value sum of net 
benefits is $323 million when the two cities compete without cooperation, and the 
pumping lift increases to 755 feet by year 25.  Pumping rates are higher during early years 
in El Paso in the strategic scenario and they decline, over time.  Pumping rates increase in 
Juarez, with the assumption that population increases at 3.0% annually in that city. 
 
  
Population Growth and Water Consumption in Juarez 
 
  Much of the increase in water demand in Juarez is driven by a rapidly increasing 
population.  Current estimates of population growth rates range from 3.0% to 3.5% per 
year, with a large portion of the increase generated by migration from other regions of 
Mexico.  Pumping rates from the Hueco Bolson could be reduced substantially over time 
if the population growth rate is reduced in future.  For example, if the population growth 
rate is reduced by 2% per year, from the current estimate of 3%, the volume of water 
withdrawn in year 25 would decline from 207,000 acre-feet to 125,000 acre-feet 
(Figure 2).  The cumulative volume withdrawn by Juarez during the 25-year scenario 
would be reduced by 473,000 acre-feet. 
  Pumping rates also are a function of average daily water consumption.  Currently, 
that rate is about 85 gallons per day in Juarez, and we have included a 2% growth rate in 
average consumption in the scenarios depicted in Figure 2.  However, it may be quite costly for Juarez to achieve and sustain that growth rate, while population also is growing 
rapidly.  The time series of pumping rates for alternative assumptions regarding growth in 
average water consumption are compared in Figure 3.  An effort to increase consumption 
by 2% per year, from the current rate of 85 gpd, would increase the volume of water 
required in year 25 from 88,000 acre-feet to 207,000 acre-feet.  The cumulative volume 





  The present value sum of net benefits obtained from water resources in El Paso 
and Ciudad Juarez can be enhanced by cooperation in determining an optimal, long-term 
program.  Pumping lifts increase more rapidly in the absence of cooperation, causing 
pumping costs to increase in both cities.  The time to depletion likely can be extended 
with cooperation, as both cities have an incentive to exploit the resource more 
aggressively when competing for the limited resource. 
  Water demands in Juarez are increasing more rapidly that in El Paso, due largely 
to a rapidly increasing population.  Efforts to increase average consumption from 85 
gallons per day will be costly, and annual withdrawals will increase substantially.  Efforts 
to reduce the rate of population growth, while increasing average water consumption may 
be helpful in reducing pressure on the Hueco Bolson and improving the quality of life for 
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